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Quiner: Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation

ATTORNEY'S FEES
IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION

It has traditionally been the practice in federal courts
not to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party under
the doctrine known as the American rule. This is different
from the practice in English courts where the prevailing
litigant has always been awarded the expense of his counsel
fees. There are several possible reasons for the development
of this American rule including "a public mistrust of lawyers, the American belief that every man should pay his
own way as well as the expenses for defending himself, and
the possibility of historical accident".'
This comment will explore the background of the American rule and its three exceptions: the bad faith exception,
the common fund doctrine, and the private attorney general
rationale. The focal point of this article will be the private
attorney general exception; its origin, development, and ultimately, its demise. A critique will be given of the Supreme
Court decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society2 which ended the doctrine. Finally, an update will
be given on the status of the rule and its exceptions since
the Court's decision in Alyeska with a look into the future
of fee awards in public interest litigation.
II.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN
RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS

A. Background
The American rule can be traced as far back as 1796,
3
when the Supreme Court in Arcambel v. Wiseman concluded that the American system of jurisprudence did not
permit the award of attorney's fees to the successful litigant
1. Note, Environmental Law-Attorneys' Fees-Fees Awarded Under Equity
to Environmental Interest Litigants for Promoting Substantial Public
Interests, 51 N.D. L. REV. 530,534 (1974).
2. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
(1796).
(3 Dall.) 234
U.S. Scholarship,
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as a matter of course. Numerous later cases also followed
this proposition.
Several reasons have been given in support of the rule.
One is that the rule gives free access to the courts without
the threat of having to pay the fees of the adversary's
attorney.4 Another reason commonly given is that the rule
limits the possible abuse in the awarding of fees.' However,
the rule can act as a deterrent by restraining those parties
who cannot afford attorney's fees from bringing an action
supported by good cause. This restraint has been lessened
to some degree by exceptions to the American rule. The
exceptions to the rule fall into two categories: those which
are statutorily created and those which are judicially created.
Several federal statutes authorize mandatory or discretionary fees. Statutes which authorize mandatory fees provide an automatic award of fees when the injury sustained is
due to a direct violation of the statute or when a party has
been ordered to obey an administrative agency's order.
Among the better known federal statutes which provide
for mandatory award of fees are: Section 4 of the Clayton
Act,' Section 130(a) of the Truth-in-Lending Act,7 and the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964.8
Other federal statutes provide a discretionary award of
fees.9 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)'o
is a good example of a federal environmental law providing
for discretionary award of fees. Section 1365(d) of the Act
reads:
4. King and Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 41 TENN. L. REv. 27, 34-35 (1973).
5. Id.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1976).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1976).
9. Statutes leaving fee awards in the discretion of the courts include: the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976);
the Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976); the
Federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (1976); the Bankruptcy Act § 2(a)(21), 11 U.S.C. §11(a)(21) (1976); the Miller Act,
40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270e (1976; the Federal Employees' Compensation Act,
5 U.S.C. § 8132 (1976); the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(a) (4)(E) (1976); and the Securities Act of 1933 § lle, 15 U.S.C. §
77k(e) (1976). Attorney's fees have also been awarded under the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976), even
though not explicitly provided for in the statute.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/9
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The Court, in issuing any final order or any action
brought pursuant to this section, may award costs
of litigation (including reasonable attorney and
expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the
court determines such award is appropriate.
A recent case, Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Costle," reveals some of the factors that courts take into
account when exercising their discretion in awarding attorney's fees. The case involved environmental plaintiffs who
sought to compel the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency to perform certain non-discretionary
duties under the pretreatment and toxic discharges section
of the FWPCA.' A settlement agreement was reached
which proved to be of importance in the subsequent administration of the FWPCA. Both the environmental plaintiffs
and industrial intervenors sought attorney's fees under Section 1365(d).
The court rejected the claims of the intervening industries saying that although the court's discretion to award
attorney's fees is broad, an award of fees to defendants
must be based on a finding that the defendants were the
victims of a harassing or frivolous action. 3 The court did
allow an award of attorney's fees to the environmental
plaintiffs, since the action had been brought in the public
interest. The rates charged by the plaintiffs' lawyers ranged
from forty dollars to eighty dollars per hour." The court
found these rates to be within the usual rates charged in
the District of Columbia area and therefore acceptable."
In addition to the many federal statutory exceptions
to the American rule, the federal courts have created several
non-statutory exceptions based upon their powers "to do
equity in a particular situation . . . whenever 'overriding
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976).
11. NRDC v. Costle, 12 E.R.C. 1181 (D.D.C. 1978).
12. Note, Environmental Financing Litigation, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 679, 683
(1979).
13. Id. at 683.
14. Id. at 685.
15. Id.
Published
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considerations indicate the need for such a recovery' 'Y'
Generally, the courts have taken the approach that fees may
be awarded in the absence of statutory authorization when
the "interests of justice so require"."
Generally, there are three main equitable exceptions to
the American rule. They are commonly referred to as the
bad faith or obdurate behavior exception, 8 the common fund
doctrine," and the private attorney general rationale."°
There is a possible fourth exception which is a catch-all
provision that gives the courts authority to award fees
when the interests of justice have so required.2' Two of
these equitable exceptions, the obdurate behavior and common fund theory, were developed by the Supreme Court and
are still effective today. The private attorney general exception was developed in the lower federal courts and was
rejected by the Supreme Court in Alyeska. A closer look at
all three exceptions will shed light on the Supreme Court's
refusal to give the private attorney general rationale any
credence.
B. The Bad Faith Exception
The first exception, the bad faith or obdurate behavior
exception, says that where one party has shown bad faith
by sustaining a frivolous action or defense against another,
maliciously or without just cause, the court may award
attorney's fees against him as a penalty.2 2 This exception
also applies to a party who unreasonably delays or disrupts
litigation, or hinders the enforcement of a court order.23
16. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973), quoting Sprague v. Ticonic National
Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.

375 (1970).
17. Hall v. Cole, supra note 16, at 5.
18. E.g., Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 241 (8th Cir.
1928), reversed on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1-(1930) ; Fairley v. Patterson,
493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974).
19. DOBBS, HANBOOK ON THE LAWS OF REMEDIES 199 (1973).
20. Newman.y. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968)
(per

curiam).
21.

Comment, After Alyeska: Will Public Interest Litigation Survive? 16
SANTA CLARA LAW REv. 267 (1976) ; Hall v. Cole, supra note 16, at 5.
22. Fairley v. Patterson, supra note 18 at 606.
23. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/9
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C. The Common Fund Doctrine
The second exception, known as the common fund
doctrine, is used when an individual creates or protects a
monetary fund or a property right from which others benefit through their interest in the fund or property right.
The Supreme Court has expanded this doctrine over the
years. The first application of the common doctrine was
in Trustees v. Greenough.24 The plaintiff, a bondholder in a
trust fund, sued the trustees of the fund on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated for waste in the disposition
of lands held by the fund. The plaintiff won the action and
then sought an award of attorney's fees. The Court allowed
the award reasoning that one who is jointly interested with
others in a common fund and who in good faith brings an
action to save it from waste and destruction is entitled to
an equitable reimbursement of his litigation expenses. The
Court went on to say that the source of these costs could
either be the fund itself or those who received the benefit
of the action.25
In Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 6 the Court expanded the common fund doctrine to apply when a party
sues on his own behalf to protect his interest in a monetary
fund thereby benefiting other by his action. In this case an
action was brought against an officer of the Ticonic National
Bank to impose a lien on the proceeds of certain bonds in the
amount of the plaintiff's trust deposit. The plaintiff won
and in turn sought a recovery of her counsel fees. She petitioned the Court to award fees from the proceeds based on
her argument that she had indirectly benefitted the other
investors of the trust. The Court found that the plaintiff
had in fact benefitted the other investors in the fund even
though she had not brought a class action per se." Therefore, the Court held that she was entitled to an award of
fees and trial expenses out of the fund she had benefitted.
24. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
25. Id. at 532-33.
26. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
27. Id.
Published
by at
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Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,28 further extended the
doctrine to apply in certain instances to an action brought
under a federal statute which does not make a provision
for the award of attorney's fees. In this case, the minority
shareholders of a corporation brought suit under Section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2" claiming
that the proxies held by management were obtained by a
misleading proxy statement. The plaintiffs prevailed, and
the Court awarded them attorney's fees although the statute
made no such provision. The Court said that the benefit
conferred on a class need not be monetary in nature, but
need only be substantial."0
The common fund doctrine was further expanded in
Hall v. Cole,31 in which an action was brought against a
labor union's management under Section 101 (a) (2) of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959."
The plaintiff had been expelled from the union after circulating petitions among fellow union members, claiming
that the union's management was incompetent and dictatorial in their administrative procedures. After the plaintiff won, he petitioned and received attorney's fees from
the union funds. The Court said that the plaintiff had
protected his right of free speech as well as the rights of
all union members through his action and had furthered the
interests of an important congressional policy. 3
The common fund doctrine was originally applied when
litigation resulted in a pecuniary benefit being directly
bestowed on a definable class and the court had jurisdiction
over a fund from which the class members could share an
award of fees. 4 The doctrine has been expanded, however,
to the present where it is applicable whenever a substantial
benefit, be it monetary or otherwise, is shared by some
ascertainable class."
28. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra note 16.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
30. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra note 16, at 392-95.
31. Hall v. Cole, supra.note 16.
-

32. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2) (1976).
33. Hall v. Cole, supra note 16, at 7-9.
34. Trustees v. Greenough, supra note 24.
35. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra note 16.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/9
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D. The Private Attorney General Theory
In 1968, a case arose which did not fall under either
of the two established exceptions to the American rule. The
case was Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,3" and
in this case was born the private attorney general exception.
The case involved a class action based on Section 404(a) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964" alleging that Piggie Park
had discriminated against plaintiff and others like him on
the basis of race. Plaintiff prevailed in the action and then
sought an award of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights
Act which leaves such an award in the discretion of the
court. After affirming the award of fees, the Supreme
Court explained that from its inception in 1964, enforcement of the Civil Rights Act "would prove difficult and
that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private
litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with
the law". 8 The Court went on to say:
When a plaintiff brings an action under [the Act],
he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also
as a private attorney general, vindicating a policy
that Congress considered of the highest priority.
If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to
bear their own attorney's fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public
interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the
federal courts."9 [Emphasis supplied.]
This suggested to the lower federal courts that a third
exception to the American rule was appropriate when a
party bringing the action served an important congressional
policy affecting many people." This exception, coupled with
the Court's easing of standing requirements, 4 provided a
ready forum in the courts for litigants involved in actions
concerning the public interest of society. The Supreme Court
36. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., supra note 20.

37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1976).
38. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., supra note 20, at 401.
39. Id. at 402.

40. See, e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974);
Cornist v. Richland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974).
41.

King and Plater, supra note 4, at 28.

42. NAACP
v. Button,
371 U.S. 415,
430 (1963).
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in NAACP v. Button42 recognized the need for such litigation by saying, "under the conditions of modern government,
litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to
a minority to petition for redress of grievances". The courts
realized that a single individual or small group would rarely
have the money necessary to stop discrimination or pollution or the violation of a civil right. As a result, they acted
to make attorney's fees "part of the effective remedy 4a3
court should fashion to encourage public-minded suits".
In the seven year period after Piggie Park, the lower
federal courts expanded the private attorney general doctrine to award fees in a spectrum of cases. In Lee v. Southern
Home Sites," a plaintiff filed suit under a federal statute
governing property rights of citizens 5 after he was denied
the right to purchase a real estate parcel from the defendant
promoter. The statute provided no authorization for a fee
award. Nevertheless, the court awarded plaintiff his fees
after he had prevailed on the merits. The court reasoned
that the award was appropriate since a strong congressional
policy was being enforced, and that a fee award would act
to encourage private litigation and enforce that policy. 6
Further cases stretched the private attorney general
rationale to include the awarding of fees to plaintiffs under
the Civil Rights Act of 1871," 7 the Civil Rights Act of 1866"
and the environmental laws. 9 The rationale has been used
as a basis for the award of fees where the suit was for
damages,"0 where the plaintiff was not obligated to pay his
counsel,"' and even where the plaintiffs lost their action. 2
An award has even been made to a prevailing defendant. 3
During this period, the Supreme Court was also confronted several times with the private attorney general
43. Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (D. Ala. 1972).
44. Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1970).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
46. Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., supra note 44, at 295.
47. Wallace v. House, 377 F.Supp. 1192 (W.D. La. 1974).
48. Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., supra note 44.
49. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
50. Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F.Supp. 683 (-D. Minn. 1971).
51. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, supra note 49.
52. McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir. 1971).
53. United States v. Gray, 319 F.Supp' 871 (D. R.I. 1970).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/9
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doctrine. For example, in FleishmanDistilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co.,54 the Court declined to award fees under the
Lanham Act 55 since that law clearly expressed its remedies
and yet said nothing regarding fee awards. Then again in
F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co.5" the Court refused
to award counsel fees in the absence of statutory authorization and went on to say that Congress was the proper place
to resolve the issue of fee awards without express statutory
authority under the private attorney general doctrine. These
cases preceded Alyeska, in 1975, when the Court put an end
to any further exceptions regarding fee awards under the
American rule.
III. THE ALYESKA CASE

A. Background Information
In March, 1970, three environmental groups consisting
of the Wilderness Society, Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc., and Friends of the Earth filed action to prevent the
Secretary of the Interior from issuing permits required for
the construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline." The injunction was granted in the first case58 and again on appeal. "
Fleishman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976).
F. D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974).
Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F.Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
Id. at 424.
Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973) cert denied
411 U.S. 917 (1973). The Secretary had indicated his intent to grant oil
pipeline right-of-way and special land use permits to the oil companies
owning Alyeska Pipeline Service. A preliminary injunction was granted
in the first case, Wilderness Society v. Hickel, supra note 57. The district
court based its decision on the grounds that the requested right-of-way
would violate § 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (MLA), 30 U.S.C.
§185 (1976), and that there had been a failure to comply with § 2 of the
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
(1976). The injunction was later dissolved and the complaint dismissed
(this decision was not reported, see Wilderness Society v. Morton, at 851),
after the petitioner Alyeska and the State of Alaska intervened as defendants, and further study was made by the Department of the Interior
and reports filed. The Department released an Environmental Impact
Statement and an Economic and Security Analysis. After the period
of time set aside for public comment passed, the Department announced
its decision to approve the permits. At this time the MLA and NEPA
issues were briefed and argued.
On appeal, in Wilderness Society v. Morton, supra, the court of
appeals reversed the lower court and again issued an injunction holding
that the width provisions of the MLA would be violated. The court did
The Supreme
on the of
NEPA
issues.
rule Archive
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The environmental groups then brought action as private attorneys general to recover their fees from the United
States Interior Department, the State of Alaska, and Alyeska.
The counsel fees sought to be recovered included over 4,455
hours of time. The court of appeals held that to recover
fees against the Department of Interior would violate a
statute which barred such action.6" As for the State of
Alaska, it had voluntarily intervened in the suit to present
its view of the public interest aspect of the case. The court
said that to tax the state under these circumstances would
"undermine rather than further the goal of ensuring adequate spokesmen for public interests".6 The court did hold
that Alyeska could be held to pay one-half of the fees even
though there was no statutory authority for it and the two
equitable exceptions, obdurate behavior and common fund,
did not apply.2 The court based its finding on the private
attorney general rationale since the plaintiffs had acted to
protect important statutory rights. 3 The court was of the
opinion that a fee award would be a good incentive to encourage public interest litigation by private parties to enforce environmental laws. The court felt that if they failed
to award the requested fees this would act as a deterrent
to such action especially where wealthy defendants such as
Alyeska were involved. 4 It was also recognized that plaintiffs' action had caused Congress to enact legislation designed
to control the use of public lands.
B. The Court's Holding
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals for three reasons: 1) An 1853 statute limited the
amount of attorney's fees which a prevailing party could
59. Continuedcase, but Congress immediately passed legislation to grant the permits to
Alyeska and allow the pipeline construction to commence under the TransAlaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. 93-153, Tit. II, 87 Stat. 584
This act permitted the construction to proceed without further
(1973).
action under NEPA.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976).
61. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, supra note 2, at 246.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/9
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recover from his opponent;" 2) There was possible conflict
between fee recovery under the private attorney general
rationale and a statute prohibiting the taxing of fees against
the United States Government;6" and 3) Congress was the
proper entity to authorize any further exceptions to the
American rule.
The 1853 statute referred to standardized costs allowable in federal court litigation and limited attorney's fees
to specified amounts.6 7 In civil actions, this amount is generally limited to twenty dollars. 8 The substance of this act
with some modification has been carried forward in later
judicial codes and is still in effect at present.6 The Court
also feared a possible conflict with a federal statute which
prohibits the taxing of attorney's fees against the United
States or its agencies in a civil action.70 The Court reasoned
that since one of the main functions of a private attorney
general was to make public officials act according to their
duties and insist upon enforcement of the law, fees would
frequently be awarded against the government and its
officials. 7
The final reason given by the Court in refusing to
award fees was its reluctance to undertake and endorse a
legislative function. The Court did recognize the federal
courts' equitable power to shift fees under the two traditional exceptions, but refused to extend this power beyond
what it already was and create a third exception.72 The
Court said the two recognized exceptions were "unquestionable assertions of inherent power in the courts to allow
65. 10 Stat. 161 (1853).
66. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923 (1976).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1976). This act provides in part:
a) Attorney's and proctor's docket fees in courts of the United States
may be taxed as costs as follows:
$20 on trial or final hearing

.

. .

in civil, criminal, or admiralty

cases...;

$5 on discontinuance of a civil action;
$5 on motoin for judgment and other proceedings on recognizances;
$2.50 for each deposition admitted in evidence.

68. Id.
69. Supra note 66.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976).
71. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, sura note 2, at 267.
72. Id.
Published
by at
Law270-71.
Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 16 [1981], Iss. 2, Art. 9

738

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVI

attorney's fees in particular situations, unless forbidden by
Congress," 3 but further noted that neither of the two exceptions were applicable here. Thus, it was the Court's view
that fee awards under the traditional court-created rules
are available absent express statutory authority, but any
further equitable fee awards would have to be expressly
authorized by Congress. 4
C. Critique
The most recent version of the 1853 statute relied upon
by the Court left out the language found in the previous
versions which said "no other compensation shall be taxed
and allowed"." The omission of this phrase might be viewed
as an intent by Congress to endorse the equitable exceptions
created by the courts. The Court rejected this reasoning,"6
however, and improperly viewed the fee statute as a bar to
equitable fee awards in this instance.
In like manner, the Court further rejected the private
attorney general rationale by saying that it conflicted with
the federal statute which bars fee recovery in actions brought
against the United States or its agencies." It appears that
this argument is weak at best since the statute here presented
would not bar taxing public or private parties other than
the federal government and in any event the statute would
not be a bar to recovery in this case. It must be remembered
that the court of appeals awarded one-half of the plaintiffs'
counsel fees as against Alyeska, not against the government
or its officials. The statute expressly prohibits this. It is
clear that it could not be done, nor was it.
Although the general rule does not permit recovery of
fees by the successful party, both legislative and judicial
created exceptions have been recognized. And while Congress
can, expressly or impliedly, restrict the fees available under
a particular statute, implied restrictions on the judicial
73. Id. at 259.
74. Id. at 271.
75. Id. at 256 n. 29.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 267. The statute is 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/9
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power to do equity are disfavored."8 The fee statute had
never before been viewed by the Court as a legislative version of the American rule or a restraint on the awarding
of fees. Neither this statute, nor the fact that some statutes
provided for fee awards while others do not, had prevented
the Court from adopting two other equitable exceptions.
Finally, the Court said it would not undertake and
endorse a legislative function. Furthermore, it said any
further exceptions to the American rule would have to come
from Congress. The Court's majority rejected the rationale
of Lee v. Southern Homes Corp.,"9 where a lower federal
court found authority to grant an award of counsel fees in
the absence of express statutory authorization. That court
reasoned that the fees could be awarded if a similar statute
with a similar Congressional purpose contained fee award
provisions. The Supreme Court was of the opposite view,
however, an opined that Congress included attorney fee
provisions in selected statutes and not in others.8" Thus,
Congressional silence in statutes regarding fee awards was
not viewed as a go-ahead to eliminate the American rule
and create an exception whenever the courts felt public
policy might be furthered.
However, Congressional silence need not be viewed as
a prohibition, but may instead be viewed as an authorization
for the Court to exercise its equitable powers and decide
the fees issue."' As was previously noted, the Court in Mills
and Hall relied on the rule that any implied restrictions
upon its equitable power are viewed with disfavor. One
wonders why, then, the Court here viewed the implied restriction (i.e. that since Congress had not expressly authorized a further exception to the American rule, then it was
not within the Court's equitable powers to do so) favorably
even though it in fact does place a self-imposed restriction
on the judiciary's equitable power.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 270-71.
Lee Southern Home Sites Corp., supra note 44.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, supra note 2, at 271.
281Archive
(Marshall,
J., dissenting).
PublishedId.
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It is not apparent that the private attorney general
exception would totally ruin the existence of the American
rule as viewed by the majority. Justice Marshall in his
dissent suggested guidelines to ensure the preservation of
the rule while allowing the exception:
The reasonable cost of plaintiff's representation
should be placed upon the defendant if (1) the
important right being protected is one actually
or necessarily shared by the general public or
some class thereof; (2) the plaintiff's pecuniary
interest in the outcome, if any, would not normally
justify incurring the cost of counsel; and (3) shiftting that cost to the defendant would effectively
2
place it in a class that benefits from the litigation.
The Court was obviously fearful of eliminating the American rule altogether, and reacted by making the private
attorney general exception its arbitrary cut-off point. The
problem of manageability of the exception was a concern
of the majority, but they should not be so willing to defeat
the alternative before giving it time to operate. Indeed, the
exception had been in existence and operating since Piggie
Park in 1968 and no court had complained of the exception
being unmanageable. Regardless of manageability considerations, one is hard-pressed to see how even an over-general
use of the exception would completely eliminate the American rule as the Court opined.
Justice Marshall's dissent also focused on the apparent
inconsistency in the Court's opinion.83 Justice Marshall
demonstrated how prior cases had recognized that the granting of attorney's fees has an independent basis in the
equitable power of the courts apart from any express statutory authorization. 4 Justice Marshall said he was "at a
loss to understand how [the Court] can also say that this
independent judicial power succumbs to Procrustean stat82. Id. at 284-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 272-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 274-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Recogntiion is also found in the
majority opinion, at 259.
85. Id. at 277-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 282-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 284-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 278 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/9
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utory restriction-indeed, to statutory silence-as soon as
the far from bright line between common benefit and public
benefit is crossed".85 Justice Marshall also did not share the
Court's concern that the American rule would be all but
eliminated if the exception was allowed to stand. Indeed,
the Court had laid down guidelines for the proper use of
all exceptions in the courts.86 He then went on to demonstrate
how the criteria set forth in Piggie Park had all been satisfied in Alyeska.8 7 As for the previously established equitable
exceptions Justice Marshall commented, "I can only conclude that the Court is willing to tolerate the 'equitable'
exceptions to its analysis, not because they can be squared
with it, but because they are by now too well established
to be casually dispensed with"."
Justice Marshall does make sense. The line between
common benefit and public benefit is not at all clear. And
even if it were, the Supreme Court, to which we have entrusted our highest hopes and expectations of fairness and
justice, should not be so willing to strike down an equitable
exception that benefits and encourages a party to bring
an action which profits the public in general by enforcing
a law supposedly created in their best interest. The private
attorney general rationale has benefitted many in the past
and has the potential to benefit countless more.
IV. THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC INTEREST
LITIGATION AFTER Alyeska

In the future, litigants who seek to recover counsel
fees where there exists no statutory basis for awarding
them, must come within one of the previously established
exceptions to the American rule. A recent case, In re THC
Financial Corp. Litigation,9 involved the application for
attorney's fees and expenses from a class settlement fund.
The fund was established after the collapse of THC, a
large industrial loan company in Hawaii. Counsel fees were
awarded to the class according to certain guidelines set
down by the court. When setting forth its decision to award
89. In by
re Law
THCArchive
Financial
Corp. Litigation,
86 F.R.D.
Published
of Wyoming
Scholarship,
1981 721 (D. Hawaii 1980).
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the fees the court said, "The fee awarded should be substantial enough to operate as a proper incentive for the
future initiation of class litigation serving the public interest".9"
United States Steel Corp. v. United States"1 indicated
that where fee-shifting determination is, by statute, left
to the discretion of the court, such considerations as the
public interest in encouraging such suits, conduct of the
parties and economic considerations will be given priority.
In this case, the court denied an award of fees against the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which brought
the suit because fees had previously been taxed only against
private litigants.
Recovery is still valid under the obdurate behavior exception to the American rule. In the recent case of Roadway
Exp., Inc. v. Piper,9" the defendant Roadway Express,
sought a fee award after plaintiff's counsel unreasonably
delayed the discovery proceedings in an employment discrimination action to the point that the case was dismissed
with prejudice. The Supreme Court ruled that while attorney's fees were not recoverable under the federal statute
in question,93 they were nevertheless still proper under the
bad faith exception.
In like manner, the common fund doctrine is also still
a valid premise on which to successfully recover fees. In
Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert,94 the Supreme Court held that
counsel fees could still be awarded under the doctrine. This
case involved a class action suit against Boeing for failing
to give proper notice of the corporation's intention to call
certain convertible debentures. The Court affirmed the award
of fees to the class and stated, "The common fund doctrine
reflects the traditional practice in courts of equity,

. .. and

it stands as a well-recognized exception to the general prin90. Id. at 738.
91. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 364 (3rd Cir.
1975).
,100 S.Ct. 2455 (1980).
92. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, -....U.S- ----93. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/9
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ciple that requires every litigant to bear his own attorney's
95
fees ....
In another case, Securities and Exchange Commission
v. First Securities Co. of Chicago,96 the court said that
despite the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska which
severely limited federal courts' equitable power to award
attorney's fees, particularly for private attorney general
services, such power still exists. The court here refused to
view its equitable power as a dying principle which the
Supreme Court could dictate as it saw fit."7
Unfortunately, the general effect of the Alyeska decision has been to deny fee awards to public interest litigants
and thereby deprive them of a significant source of funding
which they might have enjoyed had the private attorney
general concept survived. Since Alyeska, fee awards have
been denied to parties bringing action to attend public
school without racial discrimination, and to protect their
98
constitutional right to vote without harassment. In one
case 9 fees were also denied a plaintiff who prevailed in an
action to enforce an environmental law.
The future of the private attorney general doctrine
appears dim at the present. Most federal courts will understandably be quite unwilling to award fees under a doctrine
which the highest court in the land has said is no longer
valid. No Congressional action has been taken despite the
Supreme Court's mandate that any further encroachment
upon the American rule would have to be expressly authorized by Congress. The Supreme Court has remained firm
in their position in the few cases that have addressed the
issue since Alyeska. 100
It is possible that the previously established exceptions,
the bad faith exception and the common fund doctrine, may
Id. at 478.
SEC v. First Securities Co. of Chicago, 528 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 453.
See O'Neal v. Gresham, 519 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1975); McCrary v. Runyon,
515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975).
99. NRDC v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1975).
100. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412 (1978); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
95.
96.
97.
98.
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be expanded in the future to encompass the area of litigation previously under the private attorney general rationale.
Fees are always recoverable where a party can show bad
faith on the part of his opponent. The common fund doctrine appears to be the exception which is most easily expanded. It now may be applied when a litigant bestows a
substantial benefit (like a private attorney general) on a
class be it monetary or otherwise.'' The major obstacle a
private attorney general might have in recovering counsel
fees under this doctrine would be proving that his action
benefitted some ascertainable class. This class would have
to be a definable entity rather than the public at large.
In the past, most private attorney general actions were
brought to enforce a law which was of interest to all,
rather than a certain class.

V.

CONCLUSION

Alyeska has effectively eliminated a major source of
money which facilitates much public interest litigation. It
is undeniable that public interest suits are beneficial to all
and, thus, society as a whole has been injured by the Supreme Court's decision. It is difficult to accurately predict
the damage society may suffer because of this; no doubt
it will be extensive.
Public interest suits often require lengthy preparation
and great expense since complex legal and factual issues
are involved. And as is frequently the case, the action is
brought by a party who can least afford to pay for a lengthy
and complex litigation. As the state of the law now stands,
parties and groups which are genuinely concerned for the
environment and other public interest issues will simply be
barred from seeking legal redress in the courts. In other
words, society is being deprived of their legal watch-dogs
who make sure laws are being properly enforced and adhered to.
101. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra note 16.
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Various courses of action are now possible, but the
main call for help must go to the Congress. Alyeska should
be heeded as a call for legislative action to re-establish the
means by which much public interest litigation is made
possible. As the law now stands, a party may only be awarded
counsel fees where there is express statutory authority or
an established equitable exception. As shown earlier, many
federal statutes have such fee award provisions. The problem could be solved by a statute specifically allowing for
the private attorney general exception under proper guidelines. The Congress acted quickly in 1973 when the court
of appeals issued an injunction stopping the construction
of the pipeline by passing legislation allowing the work to
begin. It is not unreasonable then, to ask Congress to intervene now and restore an important right.
The public has played an important role in the enforcement of the law in the past. Piggie Park started a trend
which grew rapidly in the years in which it was permitted.
Courts are often the one and only place where effective
relief can be obtained. Congress must restore the access to
the courts in public interest litigation which Alyeska took
away.
MARK QUINER
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